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Private U.S. corporations donated approximately $6 billion to nonprofit organiza-
tions in 1994. Corporations may donate money both directly to charities and
indirectly through a corporate-sponsored foundation. Tax and financial advantages,
as well as differences in corporate image, arise due to policy differences in the
treatment of certain gifts. This paper presents a new model of corporate giving, and
examines the financial implications of both direct and corporate foundation dona-
tions. Important considerations are corporate and foundation tax rates, the occur-
rence of donations to non-U.S. (or other non-tax-deductible) charities, the sale of
assets to fund corporate foundations, and the effects of contributions over time.
Comparative statics from a two-period model provide theoretical motivations for
making certain types of gifts in certain ways. The results show that tax deductibility,
tax rates, amounts of gifts made overseas, and capital gains provisions for corporate
and foundation use affect giving. In fact, use of a nonprofit foundation for making
contributions often results in a "subsidization" of monies to be distributed for
charitable purposes and, hence, more after-tax income for the corporation.
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'The Council for Financial Aid to Education (CFAE) estimates a total of $6 billion for all
company-sponsored foundation giving in 1992. This figure, nearly four times that of the $1.57 billion
reported by the Foundation Center, includes not only cash, but also product, property and equipment,
and gifts of securities (Council for Aid to Education, p. 41).
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Table 1. U.S. Charitable Giving, by Type of Donor, 1989, (in Billions)
Total Excluding Religion
Source Amount Percent Amount Percent
Individuals $98.6 83% $36.8 66%
Foundations 7.9 7% 7.9 14%
Corporations 4.2 4% 4.2 8%
Bequests 7.0 6% 7.0 12%
Total $115.9 100% $55.9 100%
Note: Corporate foundation giving is included in foundation giving. Source: Salamon (1994, p. 20).
Introduction
U.S. corporations gave nearly $6 billion to charities in 1994; of that amount, more
than $1.57 billion came from corporate foundations.' However, out of the nearly
two million firms in the United States which had taxable income in 1991, only 1,897
had corporate foundations.2 Why do many firms choose to give only directly to
charity, while firms with foundations typically give both directly and through a
foundation? Despite the large percentage of corporate gifts made through founda-
tions, and the relatively large literature on corporate giving, very few researchers
have examined corporate foundations. The purpose of this paper is to set out the
important financial considerations of corporate direct and foundation giving, and to
develop a model capturing the financial considerations over two time periods.
How important are corporate and corporate-sponsored foundation gifts? In the
scheme of all giving, corporate donations make up only a small part: Corporate
giving accounted for 4% of all giving in 1989. Table 1 (U.S. Charitable Giving, by
Type of Donor, 1989) shows this figure increased to just over 5% when gifts made
by corporate foundations were added. However, corporations rarely make gifts to
religious organizations; corporate direct giving accounted for 8%, and the addition
of corporate foundation giving boosted the percentage to 10.7% of all non-religious
giving for the same time period.
Although corporate gifts account for a relatively small percentage of all giving,
the impact of $6 billion in gifts is important to nonprofit recipients. Providers of
educational, social service, and other nonprofit services often rely on corporate
sponsorship to run their programs. Some argue that current tax policies allow
services usually provided by government to be "subsidized" through charitable
giving provisions. In fact, the subsidy is generous. Table 2 (Corporations, Profits,
Taxes, Foundations, and Charitable Giving) shows corporate gifts were about
1.66% of corporate (pretax) profits (over $362 billion) in 1991. Given a corporate
average tax rate of over 35%, and marginal rates for large corporations of
34%-38%, gift deductions represent approximately $2 billion in lost tax revenue
(34% of the profits of the $6 billion which was donated).
An additional amount of revenue is lost due to tax policies on private founda-
tions. Company-sponsored foundations held approximately $6.6 billion in assets in
1991. The taxes due on the return on these assets were substantially smaller than
the taxes due on identical returns to for-profit corporations. Additionally, the fact
2Guide to U.S. Foundations, Their Trustees, Officers and Donors, Vol. 1. (1994). Compiled by The
Foundation Center. (C. Edward Murphy, ed. Joan Seabourne, asst. ed).
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Table 2. Corporations, Profits, Taxes, Foundations, and Charitable Giving, 1991
1991
(Dollars are in billions)
Number of corporations 3,803,000
Corporations w/net income 1,942,000
Corporate profits before taxes $362.3
Corporate taxes paid $129.8
Corporate gifts $6.0
U.S. corporate foundations (1992 estimate) 1897
Assets of corporate foundations $6.6
Corporate foundation gifts $1.57
that so few corporate foundations exist makes one question the policies allowing
tax-deductible funding of social welfare and other non-profit-maximizing activities
by business. With the average amount given by a corporate foundation being over
$800,000 annually, redistribution of funds for social and other nonprofit programs
is decided by a small group of relatively powerful givers.
Finally, current American culture and political correctness increasingly demand
socially-responsible corporations. Along with motives to increase profits, and enjoy
well-paying jobs and perks, company executives now feel added pressure to respond
to the needs of the community. Galaskiewicz (1985) and others have shown that in
some areas of the country, tithing clubs, or the business elite put pressure on
corporate executives to donate a fixed percentage of pretax profits, largely in
response to pressures to build better communities. Social and geographical pres-
sures have significant effects on corporate executives' decisions about corporate
and foundation giving.
Whether one agrees with the current policies allowing corporate and foundation
gifts to be deducted in certain ways, it is important to examine both corporate
direct gifts to charity and those made by corporate foundations. The remainder of
this paper sets out to add to current understanding of the corporate giving process.
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I introduces corporate giving to
charity and reviews the literature on corporate philanthropy. Section II highlights
the tax law and other business considerations for corporate giving. In Section III, a
model of corporate giving is introduced where the cost, or price, of giving directly
to charities and through a corporate foundation is analyzed. Sections IV and V
discuss specific policy implications for corporate giving and corporate foundations
and summarize the findings.
I. Corporate Giving and the Extant Literature3
Corporate giving is generally defined as tax-deductible cash contributions, plus the
deductible value of company products, property, or in-kind items to a charitable
organization within the United States, plus any non-deductible donations. Legiti-
mate tax deductions result from gifts made only to an activity classified as
charitable under Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3), including the corporate founda-
tion. Giving from a company-sponsored foundation is governed by the tax law on
3The sections on tax laws draw heavily on material in Webb (1994).
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private foundations defined under Internal Revenue Code 509(a). Private founda-
tions are generally "nongovernment, nonprofit organizations having a principal
fund, managed by its own trustees and directors, and established to maintain or aid
charitable, educational, religious, or other activities serving the public good."4
Company foundations derive funds from a profit-making company but are legally
separate entities which make grants "usually on a broad basis although not without
regard for the business interest of the corporation.
Studies of corporate giving have concentrated primarily on the amount and
timing of aggregate contributions in relation to the price of giving, corporate
income, firm size, industry structure, and advertising. Clotfelter (1985, pp. 194-5)
provides a summary of the economics studies of both theoretical models and
empirical work. Models of corporate giving have been based on four possible
reasons for corporate giving-profit-maximization, altruism of the owners, social
responsibility or duty, and managerial utility.
The first, and largest body of literature on corporate giving employs aggregated
corporate data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Important empirical
studies testing the profit-maximization and altruism motivations for giving have
been performed by Navarro (1988a, 1988b), Clotfelter (1985), Maddox/McElroy
and Siegfried (1981a, 1981b, 1982), Bennett and Johnson (1980), Whitehead (1976),
Nelson (1970), Schwartz (1968), and Johnson (1966). Oliver Williamson (1967)
originated the idea that the primary motives of management have a systematic and
significant impact on business behavior. Navarro (1988a), Clotfelter (1985), and
Goldberg (1979) employed models of managerial utility in their work. All of these
studies (except Johnson) employed econometric analysis to examine the problem of
how much corporations give.
A smaller literature has attempted to provide corporate giving information on
individual firms. Three articles of note are Maddox and Siegfried (1981b), Navarro
(1988b), and Stotsky (1991). However, not study has specifically examined the
interaction between corporate foundations and direct corporate charitable giving.
Stotsky's (unpublished) study analyzes the determinants of giving by corporate
foundations, and focuses on the interaction of foundation giving and federal
government support. It explores the relationship between corporate direct and
foundation gifts, but does not model the relationship between foundation assets
versus assets of the firm used for corporate giving, nor other differences between
corporate direct and foundation giving.
Both bodies of literature provide empirical evidence supporting all of the
hypotheses-empirical work has shown behavior consistent with each of the four
motivations. Positive relationships have been found between corporate profits and
giving, and corporate assets and giving. A negative relationship has been found
between tax rates (the price of giving) and gifts, and unclear relationships have
been found between other variables and giving. Thus, it is not clear what motivates
corporate contributions. Additionally (and unfortunately), the lack of firm-specific
(and reliable) data hampered the studies. The data collection process, and willing-
ness of corporations to provide data, seem to be improving, and more definitive
4The Foundation Directory (1993 edition, p. vi). For more on tax and government policies affecting
corporate foundations, see Webb (1994).
5 Ibid.
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conclusions about the motivation for corporate giving are likely forthcoming in the
next several years.
Whether corporate executives are motivated by profit-maximization, altruism,
social responsibility, or some other reason, efficient use of corporate dollars results
in more discretionary corporate funds. Even if executives are motivated by their
own utilities or self-interests, shareholders and top management likely focus on net
profitability and structure incentives in such a way as to encourage efficient
allocation and use of corporate resources. Establishing the most cost-effective way
to meet goals of the giving program is reflected in net profits, and is relevant to a
firm's choice of vehicle for giving. This paper presents a new model of corporate
giving which considers cost-effectiveness. Examined are the effects of various types
of gifts on net profits, including gifts made through a foundation and those made
directly to charity.
II. Tax Laws and Business Considerations for Corporate Giving
Corporations are allowed to make donations in any amount to any group. In order
to deduct a gift from taxable income, a firm's donation must go to a 501(c)(3)
organization within the United States. Thus, tax deductibility is granted to gifts
made to a corporate foundation. The tax code limits deductibility: up to 10% of a
firm's annual taxable income may be deducted.6 Any contributions made in excess
of 10% may be carried forward to offset profits made in later years. Additionally,
since 1981, gifts of company product or property may be deducted only on a cost
basis, except for certain gifts made to enhance technology or to assist infants, the
infirm or the needy. With a few exceptions, gifts are treated the same as any other
operating expense or cost of doing business: the cost of the gift is the complement
of the marginal tax rate.
Why would a firm choose to use a foundation? Smith (no date) has noted three
general considerations: the business cycle, income taxes, and image considerations.
A corporate foundation shelters the firm from the ups and downs of the business
cycle, allowing corporate giving to remain fairly constant over time. Webb (1994)
showed preliminary evidence that income taxes are avoided by making larger
contributions to the foundation during years of higher profits and taxes, and giving
less in other years. A corporate foundation may also strengthen the image of the
firm: it may signal the firm's intention to be socially responsible. Webb also
suggested that firms tend to "smooth" giving, implying that image or business cycle
considerations are important determinants of the decision to give through a
foundation. The final decision, however, depends upon how specific advantages or
drawbacks of corporate foundation use affect the particular firm.
The advantages to using a corporate foundation are numerous.7 Among the
financial reasons for setting up a foundation are the incentives to reduce corporate
tax liability by giving to the foundation in higher-profit years, the ability to fund a
6Until 1981, only 5% of taxable income could be donated in any year. The Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 raised the ceiling to 10%. Note taxable income includes depreciation allowances which
change over time.
7For more on advantages and disadvantages of corporate foundations, see Webb (1994, p. 48).
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foundation with company stock or appreciated property, where the foundation may
sell the assets and not pay capital gains taxes on returns from the sale, and to use a
foundation to make donations outside the United States. (An interesting story is
that of the AT&T Foundation. In the mid-1980s, AT&T donated a building in
downtown Manhattan to its newly-established corporate foundation. The founda-
tion could sell the building and pay no capital gains taxes on earnings, or could rent
the building, using rents to fund the corporate charitable giving program.) In
recent years, corporate foundation assets have grown rapidly; in 1981, they were
estimated at $2.5 billion; in 1992, they rose to $6.3 billion (The Foundation Center,
p. 42). However, unlike independent foundations, they generally depend on their
sponsoring companies for continued contributions. For financial and other reasons,
corporate foundations complicate the issue of deductibility for most types of gifts.
The primary disadvantages of using a corporate foundation result from the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 (TRA69). TRA69 requires foundations to pay a 2% excise tax
on earnings, and to pay out at least 5% of foundation assets annually. The IRS
prohibits some gifts from being made through a foundation. For example, scholar-
ship programs set up through a company foundation may give awards to no more
than 25% of eligible applicants. Many companies have scholarship programs for
the children of employees, and do not want to be restricted to giving a certain
number of scholarships. Foundations may have additional costs, as well. Finally,
making donations through a foundation involves more public accountability; corpo-
rate direct gifts are not a matter of public record in terms of the size or recipient of
a gift.
In summary, total giving is comprised of all gifts to charities, whether made
through the corporate foundation or directly from the company. Support given to a
corporate-sponsored foundation is considered a deductible charitable donation, as
are gifts made to charities within the United States. If a corporation has a
foundation, the tax deduction for charitable contributions is equal to the sum of
gifts made directly to U.S. charities and gifts made to the corporate foundation.
For a firm without a corporate foundation, gifts made directly to U.S. charities and
the tax deduction are one and the same.8
III. A Model of Corporate Giving for a Profit-Maximizing Firm
In a profit-maximizing firm, corporate executives evaluate the costs of making
contributions directly versus making (at least some) contributions through a foun-
dation. For the present, assume administrative costs of operating a corporate
foundation are equal to those for a corporate (direct) giving program. The choice
between direct corporate giving and foundation giving depends upon tax rates,
rates of return on investments, types of gifts made (cash, property, stock, other
assets), and the size of foundation assets. In addition, specific tax laws having to do
with types of gifts (property, scholarships, and the like) affect the choice of vehicle
for certain corporate gifts. The following paragraphs show simple examples of the
financial effects of direct and foundation giving. These examples are formalized in
the next section.
8For a diagram and more discussion on tax deductibility, see Webb (1994, pp. 46-7).
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A corporation's cost of giving directly to charities is the amount of the contribu-
tion less the tax deduction received from making the contribution (provided the
amount of donations does not exceed 10% of taxable income). 9 For example, if a
gift of GD = $40,000 is made to charity, and the corporation's marginal tax rate is
Tc 34% (the current marginal tax rate for firms in a certain tax bracket), the cost
of the contribution is:
GD( - TC) = $40,000(1 - 0.34) = $26,400
Alternatively, executives may choose to give $40,000 to the corporate foundation
with the intent of making donations of $40,000 to charities within the year (this is
typically called a "pass-through"). As in the case above, the corporation's cost of
giving is equal to the donation, less the tax deduction for gifts to the corporate
foundation. However, if the foundation has invested assets, it is less expensive for
the company to give the $40,000 first to the foundation, and then from the
foundation to charity.
Suppose that a foundation has assets of A = $20,000, and pays Tf= 2% on
earnings on investments (the current tax rate on foundation earnings). If one also
supposes the average rate of return on earnings is r = 8%, then foundation
earnings, after taxes, are $20,000* 0.08* (1-0.02) = $1568. Continuing the numerical
example, a gift to the corporate foundation of $40,000 is again offset by a tax
deduction of $13,600. The corporate cost of giving $40,000 to charity is:
(1 - c)GD - [(Ar(1 - F)]
= (1 - 0.34)*40,000 - [(20,000)*0.08*(1 - 0.02)] = $24,832
In this simple case, it is less expensive for the firm to donate through a foundation
than directly, because earnings on the assets of the foundation add to the pool of
funds available for corporate giving. Note, however, that the corporation could
invest a sum of funds to be used for corporate giving. The after-tax corporate
earnings on contributions investments should be measured against the foundation's
return on assets which are used to make donations.
Extending the Model
Firms which have corporate foundations tend to make some donations directly to
charity and some through the corporate foundation. Corporate gifts often include
company products and services, and company property, in addition to cash. Contri-
butions to charitable organizations outside the United States are also made by
corporations and foundations. This model considers only gifts made directly to
9In a sample of 292 Fortune Double 500 firms over the period 1984-1988, less than 5% reported
contributions in excess of 2% of taxable income in any year [Webb (1992, p. 214)]. In fact, in only three
instances (of the 292 firms over five years) did firms report contributions exceeding 10% of taxable
income. In those instances, firms likely applied the excess contributions against taxable income in
another year. Additionally, firms may donate money and call the gift a business expense (sponsorship,
advertisement, etc.). Because the 10% is almost never an issue, it has not been incorporated in the
theoretical model used here.
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charities (either cash or the deductible value of in-kind gifts) and gifts to the
foundation of cash or assets made specifically with the intent of funding the
foundation. The model considers overseas gifts made only by the company founda-
tion (overseas gifts made directly are not tax deductible, and do not show up in the
model). A discussion of other types of gifts follows the model.
How Corporate Contributions Enter the Model
Corporate contributions have been modeled in the economics literature as an input
to a profit-maximizing firm's optimization process.' 0 This model adds two impor-
tant aspects of corporate contributions. First, corporate gifts are divided between
those given directly to charity, and those given to the corporate foundation.
Second, contributions expenditures are treated as a kind of capital investment. The
effect of contributions on present conditions of the firm depends upon its past
history of contributions, and the rate at which its store of goodwill from charitable
contributions declines." Using a profit-maximization scenario, the model captures
the effect of corporate contributions on a firm's goodwill levels. The model spans
two time periods for n firms and is linear in corporate goodwill and quadratic in
profits. This noncooperative model satisfies the conditions for an interior Nash
equilibrium.
The Demand Structure and Cost of Production
The model assumes that firms choose output and the amount of contributions
expenditures needed to maintain certain levels of goodwill. There are n firms. It is
assumed that the output level may be freely set for each time period but is not
alterable within the period. Output price is easily manipulated within the time
period. In this way, the firm may set price and output, and may adjust price during
the current period so that sales over the time period are equal to production.
Goodwill and the Cost of Contributions
Several assumptions about goodwill are needed. First, contributions improve the
image of the firm in the eyes of potential and current customers, as well as
employees of the firm, and makes them more likely to buy the firm's products or
want to work for the company. (Similarly, contributions may increase the likelihood
that creditors and regulators make decisions which are in the interest of the
corporation's business operations.)
The firm possesses stocks of goodwill in the output and factor markets in the
first period, which are a function of the amount of gifts made in the first period.
Current contributions are assumed to have an effect both in the current period and
into the future. Over time, the stocks of goodwill would diminish to zero if no
further expenditures were made to charitable organizations. Larger contributions
10See, for example, Navarro (1988a), Clotfelter (1985), Maddox/McElroy and Siegfried (1981a,
1981b, 1982), Whitehead (1976), Nelson (1970), Schwartz (1968), and Johnson (1966).
11This model incorporates ideas from James Friedman's (1983) paper.
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expenditures are assumed to increase the stock of goodwill in the current period.
Finally, larger stocks of goodwill from the first period are assumed to result in a
larger stocks of goodwill in the second period." In this paper, effects of contribu-
tions made by other firms are not examined. 3
A Theoretical Model of Charitable Giving
For each firm, where t refers to the time period:
Pt = output price;
q = output or production level;
GD, =stock of goodwill from gifts made directly to charities;
GF, =stock of goodwill from gifts to charities via the foundation;
D,= gifts made directly to charities;
F,= gifts made by the foundation to charities;
Tcr = corporate tax rate;
A = discount rate for converting period 2 dollars to period 1 dollars;
5D = depreciation rate of the effect of direct gifts;
r,= rate of return on investments;
and for the corporate foundation:
T Ft = tax rate on private foundations;
F= depreciation rate of the effect of foundation gifts;
Al=amount of foundation assets;
t= amount of foundation gifts made to non-U.S. charities;
0, = amount of earnings from sales of company stock or other assets that
result in savings from capital gains taxes.
Long-run profits of the firm depend on the quantity of output and the stocks of
goodwill. This model assumes that firms choose output and the levels of goodwill
gained from direct and foundation giving in each period. Output and goodwill
enter the inverse demand function for the firm directly:
Pt P(t Q,(qt, E qt GDt(9Dd, GFI(gF,)
where p, is the output price a firm charges in period t, Q, is total production by all
firms in period t, and GD,(gD,) and GF,(gF,) are a firm's goodwill levels in period t,
which are functions of the amounts of giving, 9Dt, 9Ft in period t.
Price is assumed to be negatively related to output
ap < 0
dQ,
12 No attempt is made to examine inter-asset distortions, i.e., this dissertation does not comment on
the mix of capital assets (goodwill vs. other types of capital) employed by the firm.
13For more on the effects of contributions made by other firms, see Webb and Farmer (March 1996).
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and positively related to contributions
>p, 0, >P1 0.
d9Dt d9Ft
The positive relationship between contributions and price is based on the positive
effect contributions have on goodwill.
Costs are a function of the firm's own production (output) and contributions
level chosen in each period:
C, = ct(q,IGDt(gDt)IGFt(gF,)).




and enjoy a reduction in costs from the goodwill gained from contributions:
dc, dc,
dGD, dGF,
The stock of goodwill generated from a gift made in period t is assumed to
depreciate completely by the end of period t + 1. Goodwill increases from expen-
ditures on contributions, but exhibits diminishing marginal returns. (The natural
logarithmic form is used to capture the effect of diminishing marginal returns on
corporate goodwill from additional contributions expenditures.) It is also assumed
that the initial stocks of goodwill from contributions are zero, or GDO = GFO = 0.
If the depreciation rate of goodwill from direct contributions is D, then the stock
of goodwill from direct giving for firm I in period t may be written:14
GD! = (1 - D)GD ,_l + ln(gD,).
A more difficult relationship exists between corporate goodwill from foundation
giving and foundation gifts to charities. In the simplest case, one may assume that
the foundation acts as a pass-through vehicle for gifts. That is, corporate gifts to
the foundation equal the foundation gifts to charities. In this case, the stock of
corporate goodwill from foundation giving is:
GF, (1 - 8F)GF,1- + n(gF,).
14It is assumed that giving is greater than 1, so that the natural logs of giving are greater than or
equal to zero.
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In the case where the amount the corporation gave to its foundation (gF)
differs from the amount the foundation gave to charity (FG,) in time period t, the
stock of goodwill from foundation giving is:
GF, = (1 - F)GF,, + ln(FG,).
The amount of goodwill results from the residual goodwill from last period's giving,
plus the amount of foundation gifts made in the current period. For simplicity, the
analysis which follows assumes a pass-through relationship.
The profit function for the firm in period 1, not including financial effects of the
corporate foundation, may be expressed:
ir = (1 - TcWpj - cl) - GD- GF1 + rGDl]
which says that profits in period 1, after taxes, are equal to sales revenues less the
costs of giving, plus the return on investments set aside to give in donations at year
end. (The mathematical details of the model are presented in the Appendix.)
Substituting in for GDI and GFI results in:
I= (1 - Tcl)[(pi - ) - [(1 - D)GDO + ln(gD1)]
-[(1 - 5F)GFO + ln(gF 1 )] + rgDI 
Because GDO GFO = 0, the equation becomes:
r = (1 - cj)[(pi - c) - n(gD) - n(gFd) + rgD1J (1)
To calculate the foundation's financial effects on the corporation, consider the
following First, the foundation receives gifts from the company in the amount of
gF1. These gifts are added to last period's assets, A, and earn a return of
(gF + A0 )r, where r is the rate of return on investments in period t.
In addition, if the company chooses to donate to charities outside the United
States, the charitable foundation may be used to make the donation. Because
corporations cannot deduct gifts made outside the United States, the foundation
saves the corporation the cost of the corporate marginal tax rate, T c1 on the gift of
amount a. This implies (1 - rc)al in funds available for corporate giving
through the foundation in excess of what would have been available if the
corporation had made the gift directly to charity. Thus, (1 - Tcl)al is the first
period's savings from making the overseas donation through the foundation.
Finally, the company may make donations of company stock or other assets to
the foundation which the foundation may sell to fund charitable activities. The
foundation is not required to pay capital gains taxes on such sales: using the
foundation saves the corporation some amount of after-tax earnings which would
have been taxed away from the corporation's income under capital gains laws. If 01
represents the amount of earnings on capital gains avoided, (1 - rc)0 represents
the after-tax savings of selling the asset through the foundation. Thus, foundation
assets (funds which may be donated or invested) rise by (1 - cl)01.
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Combining these effects results in an equation representing savings or costs of
using the corporate foundation:
(1 - TFI)[[AO + g9F + ( + 01)(1 - Tc)]rl -gFl] (2)
where
(1 - TFI)[Ao + gF1 + (a, + 01)(1 - rcl)]rl (2a)
represents the foundation's after-tax earnings on investments made with founda-
tion assets, gifts received from the corporation, and funds generated from the
corporate tax savings on sales of gifts of property or stock, and gifts made overseas
through the foundation. The after-tax cost to the foundation of making (pass-
through) donations during period t is (1 - TFI(gFd). The magnitudes of equa-
tion (2a) and the foundation tax rate determine whether it is less expensive to
make donations through the firm or directly.
Combining the profit function equation (1) with equation (2) results in the
following total profit function, capturing the financial effects of giving directly and
through the foundation:
T (1 - Tcl)[(pt - c1) - ln(gDl) - ln(g9) + rgD 1 ]
+ (1- TFI)[Ao + g9F + (a 1 + Al)(1 - Tcl)rl ] -gF* (3)
What can be determined from this function? By expanding the function to
capture two time periods, the effects of changes in corporate and foundation tax
rates may be predicted. In addition, the effects of making contributions in the
current period versus future periods may be analyzed. The Appendix shows
first-order conditions, and resulting optimal equations for the firm's choice vari-
ables, q, q2 , gD, gD2, gFl, gF2. A summary of the comparative statics results of
changes of the tax rates, amounts of gifts made overseas, and amounts of capital
gains tax savings achieved on the choice variables is presented in Table 3 (Effects
of Changes in Giving on Output) and Table 4 (Effects of Changes in Tax Rates,
Output, and Non-Deductible Giving on Gifts).
The effects of increased giving in period 1, gD1, have a positive effect on period
1 output, q. Additionally, giving in periods 1 and 2, gDl, gD2, gFl, gF2, have
positive effects on period 2 output, q2 . These results are expected because the
amount of giving positively affects the goodwill levels associated with increasing
demand and lowering production costs. Due to the longer-term effects of gifts (the
Table 3. Effects of Changes in Giving on Output
A positive change in: Affects Output Year 1 Affects Output Year 2
Direct G year 1 + +
Direct G year 2 0 +
Found G year + +
Found Gyear 2 0 +
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Table 4. Effects of Changes in Tax Rates, Output, and Non-Deductible Giving on Gifts
A positive Affects Direct Affects Direct Affects Found Affects Found
change in: Giving Year 1: Giving Year 2: Giving Year 1: Giving Year 2:
Corptaxyr I + 0 ? 0
Corp tax yr 2 - 0 -
Fndtaxyr 1 0 0 - 0
Fnd tax yr 2 0 0 0
Outputyr 1 + 0 + 0
Outputyr 2 + + + ?
Overseas gifts 0 0 + ?
Capital gains 0 0 + ?
depreciation of the stock of goodwill over time), period 1 giving affects period 2
profits.
Table 4 shows that corporate direct giving in period 1, gD, is positively affected
by an increase in the corporate tax rate in period 1, T. When the corporate
marginal tax rate is higher, firms donate more to take advantage of the lower cost
(the complement of the marginal tax rate) of giving. Similarly, corporate direct
giving in period 1 is inversely related to an increase in the corporate tax rate in
period 2, TC2. If the tax rate in period 2 is expected to rise, firms put off donations
until the next year in order to take advantage of the lower cost of giving.
The foundation tax rates, T t, and the amount of gifts made to the foundation in
the form of overseas donations or property, a, 0,, have no effect on current direct
giving (their effects are captured by examining foundation giving). Increases in
output in the first or second period, q, q2, are associated with increases in direct
giving in the current period, gD1* Very likely, increased output leads to increased
revenues, greater taxable income and, thus, more capability to give and higher
taxable income.
Direct giving in the second (terminal) period, gD2, is positively related to output
in the second period. It is not related to any other variable in this analysis because
period 2 is defined as the final period in the model.
Foundation giving is a more complicated issue. Remember from the set up of
the model that foundation gifts represent both the amount the corporation gives to
its foundation, and the amount given out from the foundation at year end (a
pass-through scenario). Thus, the expected relationships between variables are
difficult to predict.
Foundation giving in the first period, gl, is negatively related to an increase in
the foundation tax rate, TF1. This is as expected because an increase in the
foundation tax rate increases the cost to the corporation of giving through the
foundation. Output in both periods is positively related to foundation giving,
possibly again reflecting the corporation's ability to give and its higher taxable
income.
Gifts which result in capital gains savings, 01, or tax savings from gifts made to
overseas charities, a, are positively related to foundation giving. This makes
intuitive sense, because the greater the advantages of making these types of gifts,
the more likely it is that foundation giving will rise, both in terms of gifts made
from the corporation and those made by the foundation to charities. The corporate
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tax rate in period 1, 7cl, has an uncertain effect on foundation giving in the first
period. The corporate tax rate in period 2, rC2, has a negative effect on foundation
giving in period 1, which may reflect the fact that some gifts from the corporation
to the foundation were delayed until the second period, when the value of the tax
deduction was increased.
Effects on foundation giving in the second period are generally ambiguous.
Primarily because the second period is the terminal period, it is unclear whether a
firm continued to be affected by changes in tax rates, output, and type of giving.
The only clear sign derived is that the foundation tax rate in the second period,
1
rF2, and second period foundation giving, gF2, are inversely related. This is, again,
as expected because an increase in the foundation tax rate increases the cost to the
corporation of giving through the foundation.
IV. Implications of the Model
The model shows that profitability issues play a large role in determining corporate
executives' choices to use direct or foundation giving programs for various types of
gifts. The model implies that the corporate and foundation tax rates may be altered
to change the timing and, to some degree, the means for corporate giving. As in
previous models, firms take advantage of the effective government subsidy on
contributions. The firm's cost of making a dollar of contributions is the comple-
ment of the marginal tax rate; the government contributes the marginal tax rate.
Tax deductibility rules on overseas giving, the limit on corporate direct giving (10%
of taxable income), and foundation exemption from capital gains taxes on the sale
of donated company assets, play principal roles in the choices executives make
about how to best fund the corporate giving program. In addition, foundation
assets and the regulations on foundation earnings and payouts affect executives'
choices about foundation giving. The following paragraphs discuss consequences of
specific policies.
Changing the corporate marginal tax rate can alter the timing and, for some
period of time, the amounts of corporate gifts. Suppose, for example, the current
marginal tax rate is expected to fall. If the fall is perceived as being temporary, one
expects firms to donate more before the fall to take advantage of the lower cost of
giving. This trend has been supported both by Webb (1992) and in The Chronicle of
Philanthropy (Nov. 1, 1995). A longer-term or permanent change in the corporate
tax rate [as Clotfelter (1985) and others have noted], affects the amount of
donations made around the year of the change, but is not likely to change the level
of giving significantly over time.
Policies on foundation taxes may affect giving; raising the rate which founda-
tions pay decreases foundation giving because it raises the cost to the corporation
of making the gift. Although it is unlikely that a change in the tax rate significantly
affects the total amount given, it may alter the choice of vehicle (foundation or
direct giving program) used to make the donation. Changes in tax rates may also
affect the likelihood that firms establish company-sponsored foundations. Policy-
makers wishing to encourage the use of corporate foundations can do so by
decreasing taxes on returns on corporate foundation assets.
An important policy issue for charitable giving is whether changes in tax rates
on either the corporation or foundation have adverse effects oh foundation or
direct giving programs, respectively. The model shows an increase in the current
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corporate tax rate has an uncertain effect on current foundation giving. However,
the model suggests an expected increase in the corporate tax rate negatively affects
current foundation giving, reflecting the fact that some gifts from the corporation
to the foundation will be delayed until the future when the value of the tax
deduction increases. The long-term cross-effects of changes in tax rates must be
examined in future research to determine their effects on vehicle and amount of
corporate giving.
How does the capital gains exemption for foundations affect gifts of company
product or property? Gifts of assets result in a net return which is higher for a
nonprofit organization than a corporation; the exemption from capital gains taxes
on the return from the sale, and the lower foundation tax rate affect the value of
the gift. Without the exemption, corporate executives have no incentive to fund
giving programs by donating company product or property. Current tax law pro-
vides the opportunity for executives to discard property and save taxes while
funding a charitable giving program. Policies allowing capital gains exemptions
increase the attractiveness of foundation use.
Tax laws on international gifts may affect the vehicle and types of gifts made by
corporations. Multinational firms may not deduct the cost of gifts made to non-U.S.
charities. Because U.S. tax law permits giving through an organized private founda-
tion within the United States, firms wishing to donate to nonprofit organizations
operating overseas may give the money to the corporate foundation. The firm then
benefits by claiming a tax deduction (because the donation is made in the United
States) and the foundation may give the money directly to the overseas charity. If
U.S. policymakers wish to curb corporate deductions for grants made to overseas
organizations, they could restrict corporate foundation gifts.15
Another policy question is, what is the effect of the tax deduction limiting the
firm's annual deduction to 10% of taxable income? In reality, the limitation rarely
matters; extremely few firms come close to donating 10%. One expects that
because firms generally donate only 1%-2% of taxable income, and because they
may use the carry-forward provision to deduct excess gifts in other years, changing
the 10% limitation will likely have no effect on corporate giving. A possible
(though not likely significant) outcome of a different limitation is that it may affect
public perception of corporate giving, which may change the amount firms donate.
One avenue for policymakers who wish to affect types of corporate giving is to
change the limits on deductibility for gifts of company products. Currently, the
value of a deduction for gifts of product is production cost, unless the gift fits a very
specific set of conditions. (Gifts made to enhance specific technology or to assist
infants, the infirm or the needy, are deductible at a cost between production cost
and sales value.) A policy encouraging donation of some desirable types of gifts
(such as computers) would allow deduction at higher than production cost.
15 Examples of international gifts are easy to find; how the gifts were made is not. For example,
AT&T regularly announces gifts made overseas. A cursory search of the Internet provides the
following example: "For release Monday, June 21, 1993. AT & T donates million-dollar lab to University
of Athens." The release notes that a million dollars' worth of "state-of-the-art laboratory equipment"
was donated to National Technical University of Athens. The equipment had previously been used at
AT & T Bell Laboratories, Holmdel, N.J. Whether the gift was made to the AT & T Foundation, and
then to the University, or whether it was made via AT&T Network Systems International BV in
Europe is not stated in the release.
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In sum, tax rates and policies both on corporate giving and foundations affect
the amount, timing, and types of corporate gifts. Policymakers wishing to change
corporate charitable giving must be aware of the differences in the treatment of
various types of gifts. Although simplified, the model presented in this paper
highlights some of the differences in foundation and direct giving, and the effects
of changes in tax policies on these gifts. The following paragraph discusses some of
the simplifications of the model.
Relaxing several assumptions of the model would result in a more realistic (but
mathematically difficult) model. The biggest challenge to the modeling process is
incorporating the fact that not all donations pass through the foundation. (The
Foundation Center (1994, p. 38) has reported 680 corporate foundations (36%)
hold at least $1 million in assets.) Costs of the direct and foundation giving
programs may differ; their inclusion further complicates the model. Overseas giving
from the corporation is not deductible, but is likely done (at least on occasion) by
corporations. Implementation of this fact may require an additional cost variable,
or some measure capturing how gifts are made in other ways (through advertising
or other business expenditures). Similarly, in the event that the corporation gives
assets to the foundation which are not sold, the cash value of the assets, and the
return on the assets complicate the foundation's earnings. Finally, because corpo-
rate foundations rarely cease to exist, the model would be more realistic if
developed for an infinite time horizon. However, the mathematics of these addi-
tions are quite challenging, and may add little to the practical knowledge gained by
examining this simplified model.
V. Summary
This paper presents a new theoretical model of corporate giving, and examines the
financial implications of making different types of gifts. The model shows that
corporate and foundation tax rates, the occurrence of donations to non-tax-deduct-
ible charities, the sales of assets to fund corporate foundations, and the effects of
contributions over time, affect the cost of corporate giving and, thus, corporate net
income. Comparative statics from a two-period model provide theoretical motiva-
tions for making certain types of gifts in certain ways. The results show that tax
deductibility of some types of gifts, variability between corporate and foundation
tax rates, amounts of gifts made overseas, and capital gains allowances for the
corporate foundation all play a role in determining how gifts are made. Even
though foundations must pay a small tax on earnings and face separate filing
requirements, use of a nonprofit foundation for making contributions often results
in a subsidization of monies to be distributed for charitable purposes. Though the
intent is surely honorable, the effects of such advantages provide some firms with
tax advantages and, hence, more after-tax income, as a reward for making dona-
tions to charity through a corporate foundation.
Appendix: Definition of Variables
For each firm, where t refers to the time period:
p, = output price;
q, = output or production level;
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GD, = stock of goodwill from gifts made directly to charities;
GF, = stock of goodwill from gifts made to the company foundation;
gD, =gifts made directly to charities;
gF, =gifts made by the foundation to charities;
tc,= corporate tax rate;
A =discount rate for converting period 2 dollars to period 1 dollars;
5D = depreciation rate of the effect of direct gifts;
rt= rate of return on investments;
and for the corporate foundation:
TF, = tax rate on private foundations;
5F= depreciation rate of the effect of foundation gifts;
A, =amount of foundation assets;
a = amount of foundation gifts made to non-U.S. charities;
0 = amount of earnings from sales of company stock or other assets which
result in savings from capital gains taxes.
Long-run profits of the firm depend on the quantity of output and the stocks of
goodwill. The output price firm 1 charges is determined by firm 's choice of
output, all the other firms' choices of output, and the stocks of goodwill chosen by
each firm. A portion of the stock of goodwill, y, 0 < y < 1, increases demand in
the output market, and the remainder, (1 - -y), decreases costs. Using a linear
form, the inverse demand and (per-unit) cost functions for a firm in period 1 may
be expressed as follows:
A n




cl '0, + 2 1 -(1 - y)(GD - GF)
where the following conventions are used: u u0 + v, which simplifies the
constant term in the profit function, and A/2 and (1 - A)/2 are used to simplify
the coefficients on q. (The coefficients on q in the first-order conditions simplify
to 1 when this convention is used. A is a constant.)
The cost of the expenditure on contributions made directly is assumed to be
equal to the level of goodwill from direct contributions, GD,, which is not a per-unit
cost. The same holds true for the cost of expenditures for contributions made to
the company foundation. Therefore, after-tax profits in period 1 for a firm facing
tax rate Tc, may be expressed as follows:
i- = (1 - TCI(P 1 - C) - GD - GF1 + rGDl]
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Substituting in for Pi and cl :
A n
, = ( - Tc ) [ U - -q - q + (GDI + GF1 ) qY
1 ((1-[OA) 1l=2Dl) GO + 1 qA - (1 - y)(GDI + GFI)q1 GDI GFI + rGDIj
(1 -C)( -1 - 2qi( + (GDI ± GF)q GDI GFI + rlGDl}
C1 1[(° ° 2 1l 2 ql l i=2 D F
O - y)(GD + G 1 )q - GDI GFI + rlGDI].
Thus, profit for a firm for both periods may be expressed:
( = - I) [(U q qil(GD + GFI)q - GDI - GFI + rlGDI)|
+ A(1 - TC2) - q2 qi2 + (GD2 + GF2 )q2
-(GD2 + Gf2 ) + r2GD2]
Similar expressions result for all other firms. As a final step, substituting in for
GDtGF, results in the following profit equation for the firm:
7T = (1 - TC,)[(u - ql- nq + gn(DI) + n(9Fl)q - DI -gFI + r9DI]
+ - TFI)[(AO + gFI + (a + 01)(1 - -C)gF1 )rl -gFI]
+ O[(1 - TC 2 )[(U - q2- _ q±+ In(gD2)
+(1- D)ln(gD1 ) + n(gF2 ) + (1 - F)ln(gFl))q2 gD2 gF 2 + r29D2
+ - F2 )[(A + F2 + ( a2 + 02)(1 - TC 2 )gF 2 )r2 F2{
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Six first-order conditions are:
(1 - Tc - 2q1 qj + n(gD1 ) + ln(gFj)= 0;
- ~ O(- c[2) u - 2q2 q21 + In(gD2 ) + (1 - D)ln(gDI)dq2 i 
+ln(gF 2 ) + (1 5F)ln(gF1)] 0;
___ = (1 - TC)[ - 1 + r] + (1 - TC2)[ ] = 0;
d9 D I 9D [ D1 
8 g9D2 gD 2
_ _ _ r q 1
- = (1 - TCI) - - 11 + (1 TFI)[(1 + (a + 1 )(1- Tcl))rl -1]
+ a1 [ 42(g 1 8F)]] 0;
__ _ =A [(1 [ C ) - (1 F
9F2 [ [2F2 1] (-F
X[(l + (a 2 + 2)(1 - TC2))r 2 - 1 0.
From these six equations, six optimal conditions result:
= - + ln(g ~l) + 1n(gF)j (1)
2 - q21 + ln(gD2 ) + (1 - D)ln(gDl)
+In(gF2) + (1 - F)In(gFl)] (2)
(l + LA - /C)[( (1 - D)q]
gD2 ( - ) (4)
-(1 - Tci)q - A(1 - c2 )(1 -F)q2 (5)
(1- TFI)[(1 + (a, + 01)(1 - Tcl))rl -1] - (1 - TC)
*F2 zs wrzx z (1 - C2 )q2 (6)
1- TF2)[(l + (a 2 + 2)1- TC2))rl - 11 + (1 - Tc 2 )
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Equations (1) and (2) may be broken down into components of marginal cost
and marginal revenue using the price and cost functions developed at the begin-
ning of the Appendix. They show that goodwill affects both marginal cost and
marginal revenue. Equations (3) through (6) show that the optimal levels of giving
in each period are determined by equating the marginal costs of the expenditures
to the marginal revenue of making the expenditures. Detailed calculations or
explanations of these conditions, and comparative statics results and calculations
are available from the author upon request.
The author is grateful for comments from C. J. LaCivita and an anonymous referee. Initial research
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